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Axel Michaelowa  
 
 
Abstract: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has seen a spectacular rise of 
activity since mid-2005 that has led to more than 400 project submissions with a 
combined estimated emission reduction volume of 570 million t CO2 eq. until the 
end of the commitment period. Several technologies have been mobilised in a large 
scale that had not been predicted to play any significant role. However, many 
observers continue to criticize the CDM Executive Board’s handling of the project 
cycle and the lack of development benefits of CDM projects. Therefore, calls for CDM 
reform have gained strength. An analysis of the CDM project portfolio shows that 
Least Developed Countries and Africa have so far been sidelined. However, more 
small-scale projects have been submitted than expected from theoretical analyses 
of project cycle transaction cost, maybe due to high CER price expectations and a 
high share of unilateral projects. While developing country companies have been 
able to capture almost half of the CDM consultancy market, they have not made an 
inroad into validation and verification. The concentration of host countries has 
increased. Development benefits of CDM projects are often limited, especially of the 
large projects destroying industrial gases. The rejection rate of proposed 
methodologies remains stubbornly high but consolidation of methodologies 
simplifies document submissions. The time lag from submission of project 
documentation to registration has recently been falling. Additionality testing is a 
key element that also supports the development target of the CDM. 
 
COP 11 should remove the cut-off date for early project CER generation and allow 
policy-based CDM as well as unlimited bundling of projects. It could streamline the 
additionality test by defining investment test and barriers more clearly and 
removing the common practice test. COP could also contemplate levying a higher 
adaptation fee from end-of pipe non-CO2 reduction projects. Annex B countries 
should stop funding CDM capacity building by development aid and support 
baseline methodology development for hitherto non-represented project types and 
host country baseline data collection. The EU and Canada would give an important 
  1signal that the CDM continues beyond 2012 by making a unilateral declaration that 
CERs will be valid in their emissions trading schemes after 2012. 
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  21.   Introduction: the surprising success of the CDM 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was set up in the Kyoto Protocol with 
the twin aim of generating cost-effective emission reductions for Annex B countries 
and of promoting sustainable development in the host countries. To ensure 
environmental integrity of the reduction credits
1 generated by CDM projects, an 
independent validation of project documentation and verification of emission 
credits was agreed and a CDM Executive Board (EB) set up. The EB’s task is to define 
the detailed rules for the CDM project cycle and to accredit validators and verifiers; 
its terms of reference were specified in the Marrakech Accords of 2001. 
 
In the aftermath of the Marrakech Accords, many observers painted a gloomy 
picture concerning the prospects for the CDM. The main fear was that surplus 
emission allowances from countries in transition would crowd out Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) from CDM projects as the former could be offered at 
almost any price. Moreover, it was doubted that developing countries could set up 
an efficient approval structure for CDM projects. The last fear, mainly voiced by the 
business community, was that the CDM project cycle would be extremely 
cumbersome and lead to prohibitive transaction costs. Even in early 2005, Cosbey 
and al (2005, p. 3) still voiced concerns that the number of projects and the amount 
of CERs would be too small to cover the demand. 
 
Four years have passed since Marrakech and the CDM has been surprisingly 
effective both regarding institutional and quantitative aspects. An international 
body of rules with an unprecedented transparency and independent control has 
been implemented relatively consistently. Over 70 host countries have set up their 
national approval authorities (DNAs). Currently, there is almost a gold rush 
atmosphere when it comes to CDM project submissions
2. By Nov. 3, 2005 402 
projects estimating a CER volume of 570 million until 2012 had been made public on 
the UNFCCC website, of which 33 had been registered by the EB. Submissions have 
been coming in since late 2003 and surged from mid-2005 onwards (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
1 As developing countries have no emission targets, all stakeholders participating in a CDM project 
have an incentive to overestimate its emission reductions. 
2 In the following, the term “submissions”  means publication of Project Design Documents (PDDs) for 
public comments on the CDM website of the UNFCCC Secretariat. All raw data underlying the 
analysis have been downloaded from cdm.unfccc.int 
  3Figure 1: Submissions per month and registrations  
 
a) “Lean period” December 2003-April 2005 
 
 




  4Figure 2 shows the number of projects differentiated according to project types. 
 
Figure 2: CDM projects according to types – submitted and registered projects 
 




1 Biomass, hydro, wind, geothermal refer to renewable energy generation. Industry, electricity 
generation, households, transport and buildings refer to energy efficiency improvements. LFG: 
landfill gas capture. 
 
  5b) Registered projects 
 
There is no substantial difference between the registered and submitted projects in 
terms of diversity of project types. Renewable energy and fugitive methane make 
up the lion’s share. However, when one looks at the amount of CERs estimated to be 
generated by the projects before the end of 2012
3, the picture changes dramatically 
(see Figure 3). 
 
                                                 
3 While most CDM projects have crediting periods going beyond 2012, the current uncertainty about 
post-2012 climate policies has generated negligible demand for post-2012 CERs. 
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Figure 3: Estimated CER volume from submitted and registered projects until 2012 
 
a)  Submitted projects 
 
 
b)  Registered projects 
Projects that reduce the industrial gases HFC-23 from production of the refrigerant 
HCFC-22 and N2O from the production of adipic acid achieve annual CER volumes of 
up to 10 million per project and thus dwarf all other project types in terms of CER 
volumes. These project types are the real “discovery” of the CDM and show the 
ingenuity of a market mechanism to mobilize cost-efficient reduction options. Other 

















































nbed/mine methane capture are not yet visible because they lack an approved 
baseline methodology. In contrast, most renewable energy projects generate less 
than 100,000 CERs per year.  
  82.  Perceived and real current problems with the CDM 
 
Heister (2005) rightly states that project-based mechanisms are always only a 
second best as they exhibit perverse incentives, methodological difficulties and 
suffer from incomplete coverage as well as high costs. However, they are the only 
possible trading instrument available to Parties that cannot agree on emission 
targets. As the CDM should move towards a cap-and-trade system to increase 
overall efficiency, CDM rules should not be cast in stone. While the market aspect of 
the CDM thus can be seen as a clear success, there are several critical issues that 
prevent an even faster development that would be necessary to mobilize the CER 
volume necessary to close the Kyoto gap estimated at around 3 billion t CO2 eq. for 
the first commitment period. Therefore, from several sides calls for reform of the 
CDM procedures have been made. These include business (IETA 2004), governments 
(Canada, India, Japan) but also research institutions (IISD, see Cosbey et al. 2005). I 
want to discuss problems the current CDM structure faces and make 
recommendations for reform. 
 
2.1  Slow registration of projects and cut-off date issue 
While the CDM Executive Board exists for almost four years now, only in late 2004 
the first project was registered. The period from submission to registration 
remained stubbornly long until early 2005 and has only come down seriously in the 
last six months (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Time gap between submission and registration for the registered projects sorted 
































The Dec. 31, 2005 deadline for allowing projects to claim pre-registration-date CERs is 
approaching and there is no indication that a sizeable share of these projects can be 
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registered before that deadline (see Figure 5). Fortunately, the EB has declared that 
such projects can be registered at all. Reasons for slow requests for registration are 
difficulties in getting host country approval or difficulties in raising the finance to 
pay registration fees, particularly in the case of unilateral projects. 
 
Figure 5: Start date of submitted projects 
 
2.2  Equitable distribution of projects 
If the CDM really aims to promote sustainable development in the developing 
countries, all developing countries would have to participate in the CDM. While 37 
host countries have at least one project in the CDM pipeline, currently, we see a 
strong concentration of both numbers of projects and CER volumes in a small 
number of host countries which is increasing over time (see Figure 6). 
 








2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 Least developed countries are sidelined in the CDM so far at 1.5% of the projects and 
0.4% of projected CER volume until 2012. Africa has a share of 2.2% of projects; its 
CER share is driven up to 3.1% by a large gas flaring reduction project in Nigeria 
responsible for 78% of all African reductions. 
 
How far do developing countries benefit from the opportunities to provide 
consultancy and validation/verification services?  
 
Concerning consultancy, several companies from developing countries have been 
able to establish themselves in the market, often as supporters of unilateral projects. 
MGM International, which is based in Argentina provides PDD consultancy all over 
Latin America and has submitted 12 baseline methodologies, two of which have 
been approved. Brazilian Econergy and Ecoinvest supported 31 and 27 PDDs. 
 
In India, subsidiaries from multinational companies support high numbers of PDDs. 
PwC India has supported 10 baseline methodologies (which have all failed) and 30 
PDDs. Ernst & Young India has developed 34 PDDs while the small domestic 
consultants Pandey and Zenith Energy did six and five PDDs. If one analyses all 
projects, the overall share of host country consultants reaches 49%. 
In a big contrast to the consultancy market, so far, only 0.5% of projects are 
validated by a company from a Non-Annex B country. Even these companies are 
from Korea which is an OECD member. As the validation market is characterised by 
a strong concentration, it is unlikely that developing country companies are able to 
get a relevant market share
4.  
  
2.3  High transaction costs 
Development of a CDM project from the idea to the issuance of CERs is a costly 
endeavour. The development of a standard PDD for a straightforward project type 
with an approved methodology costs around 15,000 €; if a new methodology has to 
be developed and fought through, costs can easily triple. Validation costs 7,000 to 
15,000 €. The EB administration fee of 0.2 $/CER for large and 0.15 $/CER for small 
projects is less cumbersome because it only accrues after CERs have been issued, 
although a part of it (5000 – 30,000 $) has to be paid up front when submitting the 
request for registration. Verification costs are still not clear but seem to be around 
                                                 
4 Market leader Det Norske Veritas has a share of 56% and the three leading companies together 
achieve 88%. 
  115,000-10,000 € per turn, probably declining over time. Costs for host country 
approval can be huge due to the delays involved. When the CDM rules were 
discussed at Marrakech, it was felt that small projects could not cover the 
transaction costs of the complete project cycle. Therefore, simplified rules were 
agreed for renewable energy projects below 15 MW, energy efficiency projects of less 
than 15 GWh annual savings and other projects with emissions of less than 15,000 t 
CO2 equivalent. Nevertheless, Michaelowa et al. (2003) estimated that projects 
below 20,000 annual CERs would not be able to cover their transaction costs. Thus 
the 44% share of small-scale projects in project submissions and 55% in registrations 
is a clear surprise. Reasons may be that the quadrupling of the CER price since 2003 
has lowered the threshold at which projects become unviable and that many CDM 
capacity building programmes have subsidized PDD development. Figure 7 shows 
the distribution of projects according to size classes. 
 
Figure 7: Size categories of submitted and registered CDM projects (average 1000 CERs p.a. until 
end of 2012) 
 
 
It is visible that the distribution is more skewed to the right for the registered 
projects. This may be due to the fact that most of the small projects are so-called 
“unilateral” projects that have no Annex B participant before registration and thus 
have problems in mobilizing finance for CDM transaction costs. Figure 8 shows the 
share of unilateral projects in different size classes. One sees clearly that the 
distribution is skewed to the left for the unilateral projects. 
 















Bundling of small-scale projects that would allow to reduce transaction costs is only 
allowed up to the small-scale project thresholds of 15 MW for renewable 
energy/15GWh savings/15,000 t of annual emissions. However, the EB has recently 
given its go-ahead for bundles of large-scale projects which means that bundles of 
any size could be formed for those projects. 
2.4 Perceived lack of development benefits 
As shown in Figure 3, a few project types take the lion’s share of CER generation. 
These are the end-of-pipe reduction of industrial gases (HFC and N2O). Methane 
avoidance in different forms, especially from landfills is also very attractive. Such 
projects do not create many jobs and also do not contribute directly to community 
development unless a part of the CER revenues is spent for this purpose as done in a 
HFC reduction project in India and a N2O project in Brazil. Renewable energy is 
represented through a large number of projects, but usually with relatively low CER 
volumes per project. Energy efficiency and transport suffer from the lack of 
approved methodologies and difficulties of organising many different stakeholders. 
Many host countries criticise this tendency. The government of China has 
introduced a differentiated CER tax with a rate of 65% for HFC, 30% for N2O and 2% 
for renewable energy. However, revenues of this tax are earmarked for further 
climate policy projects, not general development activities. Olsen (2005) provides a 
comprehensive overview of the literature on sustainable development and the 
CDM. 
 
A voluntary label, the “CDM Gold Standard” has been set up to promote CDM 
projects with high development benefits (see Schlup 2005). It is only available for 
renewable energy projects (excluding large hydro) and energy efficiency on the 
demand side. It applies a set of sustainability criteria and requires local expert 
opinion on whether they are fulfilled. Moreover, it involves a strict additionality 
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test. The first Gold Standard project (Kuyasa energy efficient housing in South 
Africa) has been registered in August 2005 and CER forward transactions from that 
project have been made at a substantial premium over “normal” CERs
5. Bode (2005) 
however cautions that labelling non-Gold Standard projects as “dirty” could be 
counterproductive in reaching climate policy targets. As long as Gold Standard 
projects continue to have a negligible CER market share this fear may be 
exaggerated. 
 
2.5  High rejection rate of methodologies, particularly for energy efficiency 
project types and slow process of standardising methodologies 
While the bottom-up process of baseline and monitoring methodology 
development has the advantage that methodologies are only developed for project 
types that are really of interest to project developers, it is cumbersome and leads to 
delays. Moreover, there are continuously high rejection rates (see Fig. 9) and no 
learning effect visible. Some project types have had much higher rejection rates 
than average, particularly energy efficiency, forestry and transport. 
 
Figure 9: Baseline methodology rejection and revision rates 
 
While methodologies that get grade B (revision) are usually accepted, the overall 
rejection rate remains 50%. One of the main lessons of the methodology process was 
the large amount of submissions for the same project types (see Figure 10).  












• The British government acquired CER forwards from Kuyasa at 15 €/CER in October 2005 whereas 
the market price for forwards from registered projects was 10-12 € at that time. Figure 10: Baseline submissions according to project types 
 
 
Some observers even feared that every project would have to submit its own 
methodology. The Executive Board countered this fear by starting the development 
of consolidated methodologies once a number of methodologies had been approved 
for a specific project type (landfill gas recovery, renewable electricity for the grid, 
fuel switch in the cement industry, biomass electricity). Recently, it has started 
consolidation already once there are several methodologies submitted, but not yet 
approved (e.g. for coal bed/mine methane, waste heat recovery in industry). Current 
candidates for consolidation would be N2O destruction from nitric acid and 
transport. A problem with consolidation is that it reduces incentives to submit a 
new methodology in an area where consolidation is looming. Moreover it is 
problematic if a consolidated methodology substitutes previously approved project-
specific ones if the project developers have not yet been able to procure the 
approvals to lodge a request for registration. This is happening with regard to the 




  152.6  Difficult determination of additionality 
From the start of discussions of a project-based generation of emission credits in 
countries without absolute emission targets, the discussion has raged how to 
determine whether projects are “business-as-usual” or are happening due to the 
revenue from the emissions credits, thus being “additional” (for a summary of the 
discussion see Greiner and Michaelowa 2003). This led to a relatively vague wording 
in the Marrakech Accords. The subsequent interpretation by the Executive Board 
has been relatively strict which led to protests from business and some Parties. As 
methods to determine additionality differed in the first baseline methodologies that 
were approved, the EB developed a consolidated additionality test that has since 
been widely used. This additionality test consists of a series of steps, some of which 
have not been defined in detail (e.g. the barrier test) while others require a thorough 
effort of data collection (e.g. on current practice in the host country). Many business 
representatives (IETA 2004) and representatives of individual companies such as 
Swiss cement producer Holcim say that additionality determination stifled their 
involvement in CDM.  
 
If companies behave perfectly rational, they implement all projects that generate a 
positive net present value at a discount rate equal to the lending rate of commercial 
banks. Thus in a rational world the stringent additionality test would not lead to a 
reduction of CDM activities, provided that the lending rate is known. As in such a 
world no project would be more profitable, the less most-profitable alternative- 
additionality test would give the same result. The effect of a financial benchmark 
would depend on its relation to the lending rate. If it is lower than the lending rate, 
projects would not be implemented. 
 
In a world of risk-averse companies, companies will use a discount rate that is 
higher than the lending rate. The higher the difference, the higher the volume of 
projects that is not implemented according to the stringent additionality test (see 
Figure 11).  
 
  16Figure 11: Additionality test thresholds and risk aversion 
 
 









Under perfect rationality and free availability of capital, companies would implement all projects 
from profitability of 0. In a rational world, they would only start at the lending rate A, effectively 
shifting the x-axis to a. In the risk-averse world, they would add the risk premium to the lending rate, 
increasing the profitability threshold to B. The difference b-a would be the loss of projects according 
to the strict additionality test. 
 
The impact on development depends on the distribution of development benefits 
according to the profitability of projects. If development impacts are positively 
correlated with profitability and companies are highly risk-averse, the negative 
impact of a strict additionality test on development will be high. If development 
impacts are negatively correlated with profitability, a strict additionality test will 
further development. 
 
If the additionality test is looking at the most profitable alternative the volume of 
projects that are not implemented will be reduced. The risk aversion will be 
reflected in the discount rate that determines the most profitable alternative. If 
companies have differing degrees of risk aversion, the situation lies between the 
two extremes described above. 
 
The effects of the barrier test depend on its operationalization. If it is implemented 
in a way that really captures the companies’ decisionmaking process, it is preferable 
to the profitability tests. However, past experience with the CDM validation process 
shows that gaming of barriers is relatively simple and not always detected by the 
validators. 
 
  17If non-additional projects are labeled as CDM projects, the marginal cost of CER 
generation is zero. This leads to a downward pressure on the CER price and changes 
the CER revenue. The revenue change depends on the price elasticity of the CER 
demand; it is negative if the elasticity is larger than 1 (see Fig. 12). 
 
Figure 12: Price effects of non-additional CDM projects 
 
 










The supply curve of CERs is shifted downwards due to the inclusion of C reductions from non-
additional projects. This increases total CDM volume from A to B, but reduces CER price from a to b. 
Revenue changes from aA to bB. Revenue is reduced if the slope of the CER demand curve is greater 
than -1, i.e. price elasticity larger than 1. Even if revenue increases, there will be a crowding-out of 
CDM projects with costs between b and a. 
 
Projects that do only generate costs but no revenues will pass all additionality tests 
discussed. There are some project categories with those characteristics that can 
generate large emission reductions such as N2O reduction from adipic and nitric acid 
production or HFC-23 reduction from HCFC-22 production. These project types are 
high-tech end of the pipe applications with limited employment and local 
environmental benefits. In the case of landfill gas recovery, flaring is certainly 
additional but if use of the gas for electricity or heat generation is included, the 
projects may fail the additionality test due to the revenue from electricity / heat 
sales. Some host country governments have reacted to this observation by the 
imposition of differentiated CER taxes, taxing the low-development projects more 
highly.  
 
Projects with revenues other than CERs will always see the additionality test as a 
challenge. Cosbey et al. 2005) argue that the additionality test should be scrapped, 
at least for small-scale projects as it would disadvantage renewable energy and 
energy efficiency projects. Bode (2005b) has developed a proposal that would allow 
  18to mobilize renewable energy projects through a tender that covers the difference 
between the revenues achieved through electricity as well as CER sales and the 
revenue needed to get the project financed. 
 
The growing trend towards unilateral projects increases the incentive of developers 
to go for non-additional projects. While the economy of a host country as a whole 
does not benefit from the relabelling of business-as-usual projects, additional 
revenues may be raised through CERs or taxation of CERs accruing to host country 
entities. This is obviously the case in the context of unilateral projects where the 
whole CER revenue remains with the host country project developer. In the pure 
bilateral case where no CER revenue remains in the host country, non-additional 
projects are unattractive. 
 
Project developers immediately react on signs from the EB on interpretation of 
additionality testing. When the first small-scale biomass power projects from India 
was registered in August 2005 despite serious doubts about its additionality, the 
inflow of small-scale biomass power projects from India increased – 56% of the total 
submissions of this project type were done after the registration of the first project. 
 
2.7  Lack of certainty about post-2012 CERs 
While CERs can accrue for 21 years, the future of the international climate regime 
after 2012 is uncertain. Thus market prices of post-2012 CERs are very low and few 
buyers willing to contract post-2012 vintages. This has a strong impact on projects 
with long gestation times and high capital costs such as hydropower. Figure 5 
shows that projects starting after 2007 remain rare and no project submitted today 
would start after 2009. If the CDM wants to contribute in bending the emissions 
path of developing countries downwards, these long-term projects have to be 
encouraged. 
 
2.8  Insufficient Annex I incentives for private investors 
For many years, no Annex I government was giving incentives to private companies 
to buy CERs or invest in CDM projects. Substantial CER acquisitions were only done 
by governments or multilateral funds. This has changed recently with the EU 
Linking Directive that allows the use of CERs in the EU emissions trading scheme. 
However, the transposition of the Linking Directive into member state law is slow 
and creates new hurdles such as DNA approval fees, additional requirements for 
project developers and exclusion of certain project types. Governments continue to 
  19play a key role on the CER acquisition side which impacts negatively on liquidity 
and transparency of the market. 
  203.   Proposed solutions 
 
3.1  Removal of the cut-off-date and shortening of pre-registration 
period 
COP 11 should decide to remove the cut-off date for allowing pre-registration CER 
generation. Any project should be allowed to claim pre-registration CERs provided it 
is additional. The 8 week period between submission for registration and 
registration should be shortened to one month. 
 
3.2  Concentration of capacity building in low income countries with 
high emissions 
So far, donor-funded capacity building activities have focused on middle-income 
countries with high emissions. Two of these countries (India, China) are now 
churning out CDM projects in large numbers and ASEAN countries are likely to 
follow in the near future due to a large Danish programme (for a critical view of the 
latter see Hesselager 2005). On the other hand, low income countries have not 
received substantial amounts of capacity building. ODA use for middle-income 
countries should be discontinued as it clearly runs against the poverty reduction 
aims of development assistance (see Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2005). While 
acknowledging that CDM cannot solve the problems of LDCs, capacity building 
should be reoriented from middle income countries to low-income countries.  
 
3.3  Reduction of transaction costs 
3.3.1  Centralized database for baseline data 
For many project developers, getting reliable data for baseline calculation (e.g. 
operating or build margin emissions factor for electricity grids) is a great challenge. 
In many host countries, these data are not readily available or have to be bought 
from government agencies. Baseline determination costs would be strongly reduced 
if the EB or an organization charged by the EB (e.g. IEA) would administer a database 
of official baseline data 
 
3.3.2  Sectoral CDM 
A “sectoral” approach to the CDM had already been suggested by Samaniego and 
Figueres (2002) and is becoming fashionable in the discussions about CDM reform. 
The fascination of this approach is possibly due to the fact that it allows many 
different definitions in terms of sector. Bosi and Ellis (2005) list three major options: 
  21policy-based, intensity-based and cap-based sectoral CDM. Sterk and Wittneben 
(2005) add sectoral project clusters.  
 
The latter option could be directly integrated into a cap-and-trade system instead of 
remaining a project-based mechanism. As experience from the setup of the EU 
emissions trading scheme shows, data needs are substantial and independent 
verification of emissions levels is important for the success of the scheme. 
Negotiation of the allocation of caps to the companies will be difficult and fraught 
with biases created by powerful interest groups.  
 
An intensity-based system would not be a novelty as it actually exists in most 
approved baseline methodologies that are emission factors per unit of production. It 
would only alleviate transaction costs if the additionality test was scrapped and any 
project with an intensity below the baseline intensity would earn CERs. This would 
obviously have a serious impact on the environmental integrity of the CDM unless 
counterbalanced by a discount factor that would take into account the likely level of 
non-additional projects. Even if that discount factor would match the actual degree 
of non-additionality, the selection of projects would be biased against additional 
projects. Non-additional projects would apply for CDM registration regardless 
whether they get 100% or 50% of the CERs as long as the revenues cover CDM 
transaction costs. 
 
The policy-based CDM is the most interesting proposal as there is already a baseline 
methodology submission that wants to credit introduction of an efficiency standard 
for domestic air conditioners in Ghana. So far, the EB did not show a willingness to 
decide this case. It would also be logical to credit supportive policies after the EB 
decision not to take them into account in baseline determination if introduced after 
the date of the Marrakech Accords. The main problem with a policy-based CDM is 
that the CER revenues flow to the government while the costs of complying with 
the policy fall on the private sector. Sterk and Wittneben (2005) discuss different 
cost and revenue sharing options. 
 
Current EB practice concerning bundling of PDDs suggests that clustering of projects 
of one technology is already possible now if an intermediary organizes CDM project 
bundling covering a whole sector. The business model of AgCert which is bundling 
methane capture from pig farms could serve as the blueprint. A simplification 
would be that only the first project has to submit a full PDD and subsequent projects 
  22can refer to that PDD for the technology description and application of the baseline 
methodology. 
 
3.4  Higher adaptation levy for low-development benefit projects 
While each host country is free to define what is sustainable development, there 
could be an increased EB adaptation levy for end-of pipe non-CO2 reduction projects. 
This would avoid the problem of “race to the bottom” if measures are left to host 
countries. 
 
3.5  Government-supported development of methodologies for energy 
efficiency and transport 
As private sector developers are not willing to put a great effort in developing 
methodologies for project types where all methodologies have so far been rejected, 
a coalition of governments could support the development of such methodologies. 
A good example is the government of Japan supporting the development of energy 
efficiency methodologies for large-scale industrial and small-scale, appliance-based 
energy efficiency projects. 
 
3.6  Consolidation of methodologies at early stages 
It has been  a surprising feature that often methodologies for one project type were 
submitted in clusters. This leads to a waste in scarce resources. Thus the EB could 
discuss with the DOEs for which project types such a cluster submission could be 
expected and then announce that after the first submission of such a methodology 
it would enter into discussions with possible submitters to develop a consolidated 
methodology from the outset. A less active variant would be to announce ex ante 
which project types are candidates for methodology consolidation. 
 
3.7  Streamlined additionality determination 
Additionality testing has to be streamlined by defining one-step criteria and simple 
barrier tests as far as possible. Investment tests have to take into account the risk 
premium projects in developing countries face. Projects with the following 
characteristics should be deemed additional: 
 
a) Projects that are the "first of its kind" in a host country. For this determination, 
narrow technological project categories are to be used - e.g. rice-husk based power 
plant, super-critical coal plant, coke dry quenching. 
  23The EB provides a list of technologies. The host country DNA states in its approval 
letter that the technology is first of its kind. DOEs check whether this is the case 
during validation. 
 
b) Projects that have an internal rate of return below the lending rate of commercial 
banks for the maximum loan duration available for private debtors at the date of 
PDD submission. The accuracy of the information is checked by the validating DOE. 
Host country DNAs can provide lending rates, but DOEs also check whether this 
information is true. If commercial bank loans are not at all available (e.g. in case of 
LDCs), an IRR benchmark could be defined by the DNA and validated by a DOE. 
 
c) Projects that have a payback period longer than the payback period commonly 
used as cutoff for projects in that economic sector in the host country. The cutoff 
payback period should be defined by an internationally accredited technical 
certification body; this statement is checked by the validating DOE. This alternative 
is more prone to gaming than b)  
 
For all other projects the additionality test of the EB remains a sensible tool. 
However, steps 4 (common practice test) and 5 (proof of CER revenue overcoming 
barriers) could be deleted provided that the barrier test is operationalised sensibly: 
 
a) Investment barriers 
 
- Technology/process risks: Project developer provides statement by an 
internationally accredited technical certification body that the process /technology 
failure risk in the circumstances of the host country is above [x]%. x could be 33 or 50 
- Funding availability: project developer provides letters from the three largest 
commercial banks in the host country and one international commercial bank that 
they are not willing to provide loans for the project despite its high IRR. DOEs check 
with these banks whether they actually refused the loan. (This however rewards 
badly managed project developers that do not have a credit rating). 
- Corruption: project proponent can show that formal acceptance of the project 
under host country regulations will not be achieved without substantial payments 




  24b) Technological barriers 
 
- Non-availability of skilled labour: Project proponent provides proof that no 
education/training institution in the host country provides the needed skill AND 
that no expatriate workers with these qualifications are working anywhere in that 
host country 
 
c) Barriers due to prevailing practice 
 
- No project of this type is currently operational [has been successfully operating for 
at least 5 years] in the host country 
 
Beyond the detailed testing of additionality, experiences from the OECD process to 
evaluate export credit agencies’ allocation of export credit subsidisation could be 
used. In the context of this process, experience has been accumulated to evaluate 
which sectors / technologies are viable without subsidies. 
 
3.8  Unilateral declaration of post-2012 CER validity 
The EU envisages continuation of its emissions trading scheme regardless of the 
international post-2012 regime. Canada is starting to develop its own emissions 
trading scheme. It would be of huge benefit if these two countries declared that 
they would continue to allow CER imports into their schemes after 2012. 
 
3.9  Crediting of CERs against domestic climate policy instruments 
In principle, CERs can be credited against all domestic climate policy instruments 
that relate to emissions in a quantitative sense. This is immediately clear under an 
emissions trading scheme but would also be possible under a carbon tax, where an 
exemption could be granted for a quantity of CERs surrendered. All Annex I 
countries with quantitative instruments should accommodate CERs in that manner.  
 
3.10  Use of post-2012 CERs for first commitment period compliance 
Some Japanese researchers have proposed that post-2012 CERs could be used during 
the true-up period following the first commitment period. As it will take at least one 
year until the exact inventory levels for 2012 are known, CERs of 2013 could be used 
to ensure compliance for countries that face an unexpected shortfall. This would 
require a second "adjustment period" after the one currently in the compliance rules 
of the Kyoto Protocol. 
  254.   Conclusions 
 
Contrary to the perceptions of many, the CDM so far is a clear success as it has 
generated hundreds of project proposals that currently estimate more than 0.5 
billion t emission reductions. The market incentive has led to the implementation of 
technologies that were unknown except to some specialists only three years ago. To 
further enhance this success, a number of options exists to reduce transaction costs 
and allow the integration of new project types under the CDM. The international 
community does not have to make substantial changes to the Marrakech Accords to 
implement these options. Moreover, several important options exist for Annex I 
countries to unilaterally increase attractiveness of the CDM. The CDM will however 
never be able to solve all development problems of the world nor to bring foreign 
direct investment to least developed countries. 
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